I posted this blog this past fall on the accursed share, a growing philosophy/political theory blog. Please check out the site when you finish reading this!
“Is Ontology Fundamental?”
This my first blog, so I decided to start with something of special interest to me. I will give a brief exegesis of Emmanuel Levinas’ essay, “Is Ontology Fundamental?”. In this text Levinas outlines his critique of Heidegger’s project of fundamental ontology and introduces in basic terms the concept of the Other. Whereas Levinas worked with Heidegger for a short time, this paper marks Levinas’ shift away from Heidegger’s project. A major concern in Levinas’ critique is the failure to support an ethics. Levinas’ aim in his critique of Heidegger’s project is to show a relation that exceeds the bounds of the science of being (i.e., ontology).
It is perhaps helpful for some who have not had a proper introduction to Heidegger that I give a few words on the theme of Heidegger’s fundamental ontology. This is by no means a ‘proper’ introduction, and I recommend you sit down with some Heidegger and try it out to get the best understanding. In Being and Time, Heidegger addresses the question of the meaning of being. In doing so, he argues that Dasein’s (i.e., the human way of being, human being; being there, and there being.) understanding of being (i.e., ontology) is the condition of the possibility of existence.
Through the authentic understanding of being as such and in general on the one hand, and on the other hand the inauthentic understanding that consists primarily in the forgetfulness of the ontological difference (between being as such and in general and beings/’entities’), one always already has a particular understanding of being. Such an understanding is, according to Heidegger, fundamental to experience and even to being itself in the Heideggerian scheme. The ontological difference can be explained by the following two statements: “The being of beings “is” itself not itself a being” (Heidegger 5); but, “being is always the being of a being” (ibid. 7).
A primary characteristic of this understanding of being is that it is not merely intellectual, but rather consists in every facet of human activity. That is, Ontology is not simply about knowing, it is about doing. Such a distinction provides a first step for Levinas’ move towards an ethics, a step that nevertheless requires a refutation of Heidegger’s ontology.
The current discussion turns away from introductory remarks about Heidegger towards Levinas’ critique.
If we think of being as constituted by the comprehension of being, as Heidegger does, then the relation with the Other, which (as it will be shown) always exceeds our comprehension, also exceeds being. Comprehension always moves from the particular to the universal. We move from the particular tree to the idea of the tree, to use the language of Plato, which in its own right does not fully reflect Heidegger’s ontology in that it posits the being of beings as a being, namely an ‘idea’. In more Heideggerian terms, we move from a being/entity to being as such and in general.
As such, comprehension always places the particular in the context and confines of a system: comprehension literally de-fines, in the most etymological sense of this word. This is a move toward totality: it sets out the bounds of experience and assumes the insurpassibility of these bounds. However, our relation with the Other always already exceeds the bounds of our totalizing ‘system’ of knowing. To know the other, distinguished from generally experiencing the other, is to reduce the other to the Same.
What then is the nature of my relation with the Other, if not a relation within my comprehension? Consider the distinction made popular by Derrida: the distinction between the naming (i.e. labeling) of an entity—and the invocation or calling out to an entity. The first assumes the entity as a direct object of my act of comprehension, my placing it within a system of signification and understanding with reference to an overarching arche. Calling out, an invocation, “priere” in French (to pray; to invoke) to some entity does not reduce that entity to a point within a referential totality.
When one names an entity, one defines it; that is, one places it within the confines of a particular definition that gains signification only within a totality of reference. This is the function of comprehension. In contrast, a calling out or invocation does not attempt to ‘possess’ or ‘consume’ the particular (read: the Other) within a totality of reference, but rather lets the entity reveal itself as it is ‘in-itself’. We cannot but have this second type of relation with the Other, since to enframe the Other in a referential totality is to reduce the Other to the Same. It is only in calling-out to the Other that we remain in relation with the Other.
Levinas calls the ‘Self’s’ (this word has its implications, not to be discussed here for the sake of brevity, but merely to be pointed out) relation with the Other “religion” (Levinas 8), which should not be understood merely in the everyday sense. Religion entails a faith in the unidentifiable that does not reduce it to a defined conception, but lets it “be” as it is. Faith is the form of non-knowing. “Religion”, therefore is a fitting term to be borrowed and applied to the Self’s relation with the Other (for more on “religion” in this sense, see Levinas’ Totality and Infinity, n.b. 40 of the cited edition).
Here we have a distinction between on the one hand a comprehension that names the Other and thus places the Other in the context of a totality, and on the other hand a relation with the other that lets the Other reveal itself as it is in-itself, that is, separate from our comprehension. The naming of the Other, insomuch as it limits the particular to a general concept, is “a partial negation that is violence” (Levinas 9). It is at the same time a taking possession of the Other, an enslavement… or at least it would be if such a relation were possible. As I stated before, such a relation is precisely not a relation with the Other, since it reduces the Other to the Same. I am unable to possess the Other in the totality of knowing. The Other infinitely exceeds my grasp.
If I could exercise complete power over the Other, I could fully negate the Other: such a negation would be nothing short of murder. However, even in murder the “Who” of the Other escapes me. The relation is no longer one with the Other in-itself, but rather a relation to an object, a thing in the world, within the horizon of my totality of knowing. Levinas says, “To be in relation with the Other face to face is to be unable to kill. It is also the situation of discourse” (9).
So to address the question that titles the paper: “Is Ontology Fundamental?” No, Levinas contests. Ontology—insofar as it is a science, a knowing, a ‘logy’—is the reduction of the Other to the Same; a reduction that always defines limits to form a referential totality. Since the Other always already exceeds the definite limits of such a totality, we cannot, after all, consider ontology fundamental.
-Joshua Blackmore
Works cited
Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time. Trans. Joan Stambaugh.
Levinas, Emmanuel. “Is Ontology Fundamental?”. Basic Philosophical Writings. Ed. Peperzak, Adriaan T., Simon Critchley and Robert Bernasconi.
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